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DOCUMENTS

[Under this head it is proposed to print in each issue a few documents of historical importance, hitherto unprinted. It is intended that the documents shall be printed with verbal and literal exactness, and that an exact statement be made of the present place of deposit of the document and, in the case of archives and libraries, of the volume and page or catalogue number by which the document is designated. Contributions of important documents, thus authenticated, will be welcomed.]

I. Lord Burghley on the Spanish Invasion, 1588.

THE following is among the most remarkable of that mass of state papers in Lord Burghley's peculiar, cramped, and slanting hand, which bear witness to the sagacity and astounding industry of Elizabeth's great minister. It has long been a matter of keen regret that no historian has thus far been able to describe the part played by English statesmen in the Armada crisis. Here the veil is lifted for a moment upon one of the most impressive sittings of the Council during that troubled period. Burghley, cautious and wise with the experience of four storm-tossed reigns, was hoping against hope that he might steer England clear of the danger which threatened from Spain. Yet, while he was seriously considering the possibility of a sound and honorable peace with "the mightiest enemy that ever England had," we find the venerable minister reading his attentive colleagues an able state paper which showed him prepared for every contingency of vigorous, aggressive war. Surely Motley must have been mistaken in thinking Burghley was meant when the Lord Admiral cursed the peacemaking "long grey beard with a white head witless."

In emphasizing the religious element of the struggle, an aspect which the modern historian is too prone to neglect, Burghley strangely enough suggests for the queen a motto almost identical with the *Exsurge Domine et indica causam tuam* embroidered on the Armada standard. He had, it would seem, a vague notion that, as Catholics and Protestants were both defending the cause of the Almighty, it behoved the English to surpass the Spaniards in piety as well as in sailing and fighting. "We are truly certified," he wrote, soon after the Armada appeared in the Channel,

"how diligent the enemy is by prayers, fastings, pilgrimage, etc., to commend their tyrannous intents to God, and therefore there is more reason for us to commend our just cause to his mercy."¹ But while declaring that "the first and last Comforter for her Majesty to take hold on" was the Lord of Hosts, Burghley was determined to neglect no practical measure which might ensure success. He traces with great force and breadth of view England's policy in case of war, and adds a detailed and liberal estimate of the costs. Most remarkable is his plan for the naval campaign. Burghley's pen anticipates not only the strategy which Howard and Drake so successfully employed against the Armada, but even advocates a descent upon Spain similar to that which Drake himself afterwards urged, but, to his great disgust, was not allowed to execute. We thus see that the victory over Spain was not alone the work of Elizabeth's splendid sailors. While the heart of every Englishman may well beat high at the story of Drake and Grave-lines, the historian must remember that it was not the audacious genius of Drake, but the far-seeing mind of the responsible minister, that took the foremost part in shaping the destiny of England.

W. F. TILTON.

(British Museum. MSS. Vespasian C. VIII, f. 12. Holograph by Lord Burghley, endorsed by him "25 Febr. 1587 [this date is of course Old Style]. Treaty for peace wt [with] Spayn. A Consultation uppon Certen Question[s] in p[re]sence of L. Chanc[ellor], L. Tres. [Burghley], L. Stuard [Steward], Mr. Secret. [Walsingham], Mr. Wolly.)

First is to be considered . . . the p[oin]t of the Ennemy. The K. of Spayn being the p[ri]ncipal and therto both provoked and ayded by the pope and his quarrell, p[ri]ncipally grounded for the popes religion and to subvert the Chri[sti]an religion p[ro]fessed by her Ma[jes]ty and her people and for th^t [that] cause makyng this warr ageynst hir p[er]son and realm, ther is accompt to be made th^t all the papists th^t have any power to offend hir Ma[jes]ty or hir people will yeld ther powers to joyne wt [with] hym and so accompt is to be made of hym and his forces ageynst hir Maty. And as his will joyned wt the generall mallyce of his Confederats is known to excede in Mesure, as not to be satisfyced wtout obteyning his desyre of conquest as well for the subduyng of relligion as for enlargyng his temporall power by reason of his ambicion, so is his power by men and specially by mony larger than any other Monarch of Chr[ist]endom. For to consider the nombres of men of warr, besyde such as he hath to command of spanyards and now of portygales [Portuguese] wherof though the nombre is not so great as other Kyngs have, yet of them he hath by reason of ther long trayning in warrs these many ye[a]rs and specially in the low

¹ British Museum MSS. Add. 32092. 26, f. 102.

Contreys a gretar [greater] nombre of exercised captayns and soldiors than any other Kyng hath. Beside these he hath commodite to have great nombres of men of warr both for the land and the sea out of Italy from the pops dominions, out of Naples, Sicily and Millan of his own, out of Savoy and Florence from the 2 duks the formar being his son in law, the other a Creatur of the popes, and from Genua, Naples and Sicily help of shippes and Gallyce. In lyk manner he hath commodyte to have very great and puissant nomb. both horssmen and footemen out of Germany by favor of Themp[er]or and by confederatyng to him of the papisticall Bishoppes and p[ri]nces of the emp[ire] by pensions and wag[e]s, and at this prsent also he hath at his commandment the forces of all the p[ro]vynces being 17 in the low Contreys savyng Holland, Selland [Zeeland] Utryct and pt of Geldres and Fresland, so as whosoever shall accompt what nombres of men of war and of shippes and Gallyes he may have to s[er]ve his purporss bouth by sea and land, if he may have mony to paye them, shall certainly determyn that he is the mightiest enemy that ever England had, yea mightyar than ever his father the Em[per]or Charles or any other Monarch of Chr[ist]endom was these many years. . . .

It followeth to be considered in what sort for place tyme and nombres it may be thought he will mak his warrs to offend the Q[ueen's] Maty and hir Dominions.

His most commodite shall be to invade England and Irland joyntly at on[e] instant, wc he is to do by sea, for which purporss he must have a Great Navy of shippes wherof he hath and may have plenty, to carry an army very great to land in England, and a smaller in Irland, because he p[re]sumeth ther can be no resistance, but rather an asistance of the people miscontented. He also may be probably advised to send some small nombres of skylfull captayns and soldiors into Scotland, wherto if the Kyng shall be willyng, he may wt [with] more probabilitie offend England greatly by sendyng mony wt his generall, to wage both the Kyng yt [that] is poore in mony and his people to enter by mayne land into the north of England by the north, but if the scottish King shall not yeld to the spanish attempts, yet suerly consideryng so great a party of late grown of the Noble men of the land to be devoted papists and sworn ennemys to England. . . .

Upon these considerations remembred on the pt of this great Ennemy may it well appeare not only how great and puissant he is but what comoditees he hath to funder his actions, if God by his goodness asistyng hir Maty in the exequution of hir actions shall not enhable hir to mak a good defence, for wc [which] purporss, followyng the formar mention of hir Maty as the pncipall pty th' must susteyn this warr for defence of God's cause, himself and hir countrey, ther ar to be considered what forces hir Maty hath and may have both of hir own and other auxiliar[y] helps, and how besyde hir defence she may impeach and offend the K. of Spayn in his grettest enterp[ri]ses.

The first and last Comfortor for hir Maty to tak hold on is the Lord of

hosts, for whose cause only hir Ennemyes ar risen wt might and fury to overthrow the Gospell of christ and the professors therof so as hir Maty may saye wt David Exurge Deus, Judica causam tuam and lykwise Dominus mihi Adiutor et ego despiciam inimicos meos. And so wt a firm hope of God's assistance in his cause ther may be remembred all these thyngs followyng for th strength of hir Maty not only for hir defence, but for offence of the Ennemy, notwithstanding his apparant wor[l]dly mightynes.

The Realms of England cannot from Spayn or the low Contreys be assayled but by sea.

Therfor hir Matys speciall and most prop[er] defence ageynst the Ennemys Navy must be by shippes. And hir defence ageynst them wc [which] shall land must be by power on the land.

For shippes of England hir Maty is of hir own prop[er] shippes so strong as the ennemy shall not be hable to land any power, wher hir Matys Navy shall be neare to the Ennemyes Navy. The shippes of hir subjects ar also at this daye both in nombre, in strength, in hable captayns and marryners stronger than ever they war in the memory of any man. To the augmentation of this English Navy ar to be joyned the shippes of warr of Holland and Selland [Zeeland] accordyng to ther compact. . . .

If the K. of Scotts may be recovred to be a frend to hir Maty and the realm as reason ought to move hym, consideryng his expectancy, [*i.e.* of the English crown] the Navy of England might have some ayd of shippes for 2 or 3 months though they ar not of great burthen. Yet they may s[er]ve to empeach landyng.

If warr also shall follow betwixt Spayn and England reason wold [would] th^t the french Kyng shuld wtdraw all aydes from Spayn, as of vittells into Spayn and of marrynors into Flanders.

The Navy of England may be so devyded as the on[e] pt may be here in the Narrow Seas on the est pt of England and another pt on the west towards Irland and Spayn, by which meanes the spanish Navy shall not be hable to come to the low Contreys to joyne wt the flemish Navy, for the English western shall follow them if they come to the est, and they shall be intercepted by the English Est Navy.

It shall also be to a great purporss to provyde a nombre of shippes th^t may mak a voyadg to portyngale [Portugal], to put comfort in the portyngales when the spanish army is come to the sea and if the K[ing] Antonio [the Portuguese Pretender] might be enhabled to land in portyngale, the K. of spayn shuld hazard the Crown which he now possesseth, whylest he seketh for another yt nether he hath nor ought to have.

If also in tyme of the yere convenient shipping may be redy to pass to the Ilands to intercept some of the Indian flete, the exequution therof will be very profitable for the mayntenance of the charges of the warrs and the report of the intention to put such a Navy in redynes in the Name of S. francise Drak may be an occasion to deminish the nombre of the K[ing]'s shippyng ageynst England or percase [perchance] a diversion of his purporss ageynst England. . . .

Now followeth to be considered how hir Maty shall maynteane the charges for this warr, for though God hath gyven hir people to serve hir both on the sea and on the land yet of Necessite ther must be mony to paye the wages of hir armyes both by sea and by land wt [with] vitylls by sea and also for the hyre of shippes, repaying of hir own shippes and new byldyng of some, for powdre, Munition, and other thyngs req[ui]sit for ordonance, for sayles, masts, cordage, and all other apparrellyng for hir shippes, for munition and powder both for hir forts and for hir armyes by land, of all which charges it is hard to mak any certayn estymat, but yet to gyve occasion to consider therof these articles followyng ar to be considered.

Navy. First the charges of hir Matys shippes and pynnasses being about XXXVII [37] wherin ar to serve nere [near] hand [*i.e.* about] VI M [6000] men, the chardges wherof will by estimation arise in prest, conduct, wages and victell for 3 months to the some of XXXIIII M l. [£34,000] and for XXX [30] other shippes of M[er]chants mete for war, wherein are to serve IIII M II C [4200] men, the charges wherof to s[er]ve for 3 month will amount to XVII M l. [£17,000], in the whole LI M l. [£51,000]. And for th^t it will be necessary to have mo[re] shippes wt II M [2000] men mo[re], the same will be for 3 months more about IX or X M l. [£9000 or £10,000], so in the whole the chardg may be LX M l. [£60,000] at the lest.

Ther is to be added to this chardg for all manner of p[ro]visions of powder and other munition wt cordage and other apparrellyng by estymation about V M l [£5000], and if the Navy shall s[er]ve 3 months more the chardg will be dob[le].

To this chardg is to be added the Q[ueens] Matys charges in the low Contreys amontyng to I C xxvi M l [£126,000] in certenty, and to be added for extraordinary by estimation yerly IIII M [£4000] in toto XXX M p. annum [he means £130,000 per annum and writes that sum on the margin].

Ther is to be added if ther shall be dowl of breach wt Scotland a chardg at the lest for III M [3000] men to ly on the borders wc for IIII months will amount to XII or XIII M l. [£12,000 or £13,000].

To this is to be added a necessary chardg at the lest of I M [1000] men to be sent into Irland to inress the army ther for defence of the same wc [which] for VI months wt charge of prest, conduct, Cote [coat] mony and transportations will amount to VII M l [£7000] besyde xxv M l [£25,000] for the ordinary ther.

The inress of soldiors in the forts in Kent and of portsmouth . . . for a year IV M l [£4000].

The charges th^t necessary must insew if an army be levyed to repayre to the sea costs for defence ageynst landyng or to fight wt the ennemy whan he is landed cannot be less than for XM [10,000] men, which accomptyng the same at the lest, wt shott and munition cannot be less than XII M l. [£12,000] and if the landyng be in sondry places the same must be doobled, th^t is XXIV M only for 1 month.

It is to be considered that wha[t] soever shall be uppon the seas wt appearance to land, ther must be an army in redyness to attend on the Q. pson [Queen's person] which cannot be less than of XX M men which for II months at the lest may be estemed at XL M l. [£40,000].

2. McKean to Washington, 1789.

For the following, from the archives of the Department of State (vol. "Applications for Office"), the readers of the REVIEW are indebted to Edward I. Renick, Esq., of that department :—

PHILADELPHIA

April 27th 1789.

Sir,

I have an ambition to take a share in Your Excellency's administration, and know of no line in which I can render so good service as in the judicial department. Having expressed this, it will, I trust not be deemed indelicate in me to give a short account of myself and my studies.

I was born in Chester county in this State, and having been instructed for seven years in the latin and greek languages, and the arts and sciences usually taught in the schools, I commenced the study of the law at the age of sixteen in Newcastle ; at the age of twenty I was admitted to the bar in the courts of common pleas and also in the supreme court of Delaware, and soon after in the supreme courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. From that time to the present, the law has been my principal study and my only profession. It is true I have gone thro' the rotine of office, have been annually elected for seventeen years a member of Assembly for Newcastle county ; was a member of Congress, first at New York in 1765, and from 1774 until the day I had assurance that the preliminaries of peace were signed : But these employments added to and enlarged my legal knowledge.

Among the learned, I early in life received the degree of Master of Arts from the College of Philadelphia, and have since been honored with the degree of Doctor of Laws by two other Colleges and one University. I am also a Trustee of three incorporated seminaries of learning, and a member of several societies for the promoting the arts and useful knowledge. My official rank may probably be known to you, I shall therefore only mention, that I have been Speaker of the Delaware Assembly both before and since the Revolution, and sometime President of Congress : In 1766 I first took a seat on the Bench at Newcastle, having before been in the commission of the peace and a Justice of the common pleas for that county, and had influence enough to have justice administered upon unstamped paper. When the Stamp-Act was repealed I returned to the Bar and there remained until 1777 when I was appointed Chief Justice of the supreme court of Pennsylvania ; which station I have now held near twelve years, having been twice chosen by an unanimous ballot. These honors